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In 1936, in response to federal incentives' and the economic con-
ditions of the Great Depression, Pennsylvania enacted an unem-
ployment compensation law, the general purpose of which is to
grant unemployment compensation to unemployed persons who
are "unemployed through no fault of their own."2 In establishing
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Department of Labor and Industry, or the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The au-
thors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Kristen W. Brown, Esq., Jerome H. Gerber,
Esq., Michael D. Klein, Esq., and John T. Kupchinsky, Esq. in the preparation of this
article.
1. These federal incentives were in Title IX of the Social Security Act of 1935, 42
USC § 1101 (1987). For a brief review of the federal incentives, see Virgil J. Haggart, Jr.,
Unemployment Compensation During Labor Disputes, 37 Neb L Rev 668, 668-74 (1958).
For a brief review of the draft bills prepared by the Committee on Economic Security, see
Milton L. Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dispute" Disqualification, 17 U
Chi L Rev 294, 295 (1950). More than one commentator has noted that states enacted un-
employment compensation laws under federal pressure and "without giving any real consid-
eration to their provisions." Edwin E. Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensa-
tion, 55 Yale L J 21, 33 (1945); Shadur, 17 U Chi L Rev at 294 (cited within this note).
2. Section 3 (Declaration of Public Policy) of the Unemployment Compensation
Law, Act of Dec 5, 1936, Pub L No 2897 (1937), 43 Pa Stat § 752, states:
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals,
and welfare of the people of the Commonwealth. Involuntary unemployment and its
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qualifying and eligibility3 standards, the Pennsylvania legislature
has frequently amended the Unemployment Compensation Law
(hereinafter "the Law"). These amendments, over sixty of them
during the past fifty-six years, reflect legislative and societal atti-
tudes about the nature of unemployment compensation.
One of the least understood but most bitterly contested eligibil-
ity standards involves Section 402(d) of the Law,4 the labor dis-
pute section.5 This article will explore the legislative history of
Section 402(d), culminating in the enactment in 1949 of the lock-
out exception, and the judiciary's subsequent attempts to distin-
guish strikes and lockouts as required by the 1949 amendment.
Those attempts have resulted in a highly refined body of law in the
two contexts in which the strike-lockout distinction has arisen, i.e.,
resulting burden of indigency falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker,
and ultimately upon the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions in the form of
poor relief assistance. Security against unemployment and the spread of indigency
can best be provided by the systematic setting aside of financial reserves to be used
as compensation for loss of wages by employees during periods when they become
unemployed through no fault of their own. The principle of the accumulation of fi-
nancial reserves, the sharing of risks, and the payment of compensation with respect
to unemployment meets the need of protection against the hazards of unemployment
and indigency. The Legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment
the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this Commonwealth require
the exercise of the police powers of the Commonwealth in the enactment of this act
for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit
of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.
Id.
3. Section 401 of the Law, 43 Pa Stat § 801 (1991), is entitled "Qualifications Re-
quired to Secure Compensation." Section 402 of the Law, 43 Pa Stat § 802 (1991), is entitled
"Ineligibility For Compensation." The eligibility requirements that have produced the most
litigation are Section 402(b), the voluntary-quit section, and Section 402(e), the discharge
section.
4. Section 402(d) of the Law, 43 Pa Stat 802(d) (1991), presently provides:
An employee shall be ineligible for compensation for any week. . . in which his un-
employment is due to a stoppage of work, which exists because of a labor dispute
(other than a lockout) at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is
or was last employed: Provided, That this subsection shall not apply if it is shown
that (1) he is not participating in, or directly interested in, the labor dispute which
caused the stoppage of work; and (2) he is not a member of an organization which is
participating in, or directly interested in, the labor dispute which caused the stoppage
of work, and (3) he does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immedi-
ately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at
the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in, or di-
rectly interested in, the dispute.
Id. This section has remained unchanged since 1949.
5. For a detailed analysis of all provisions of Section 402(d), see Sydney Reuben and
Daniel R. Schuckers, The Labor Dispute Disqualification of the Pennsylvania Unemploy-
ment Compensation Law, 50 Temple L Q 211 (1977).
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work stoppages6 that occur at the expiration of a collective bar-
gaining agreement and work stoppages that occur during a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. This body of law, which has developed
during the past four decades, however, is not totally consistent and
uniform.
II. STANDARDS PRIOR TO 1949
The Pennsylvania legislature enacted the lockout exception in
1949, thirteen years after the enactment of the original unemploy-
ment compensation law. The original law required a three-week
waiting period for employees who were unemployed due to a "vol-
untary suspension of work resulting from an industrial dispute."7
The initial law and subsequent pre-1949 amendments" did not con-
tain the words "strike" or "lockout." Accordingly, much of the liti-
gation during this period concerning this disqualification9 involved
the definition of "voluntary suspension of work"'10 and the defini-
6. Numerous commentators have noted that a work stoppage refers to the status of
production at the employer's premises rather than to the individual claimant's cessation of
work. Abraham Abramowitz, "Stoppage of Work Due to a Labor Dispute" as Defined by
the Unemployment Compensation Laws, 10 Geo Wash L Rev 604, 607-08 (1942); Herbert
A. Fierst & Marjorie Spector, Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes, 49 Yale L J
461, 483 (1940). See also Willard A. Lewis, The "Stoppage of Work" Concept in Labor
Dispute Disqualification Jurisprudence, 45 J Urban L 319, 326 (1967); Bullitt, Unemploy-
ment Compensation in Labor Disputes, 25 Wash L Rev 50, 63 n 52 (1950); Leonard Lesser,
Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, 55 Yale L J 167, 168 n 4 (1945). Al-
though the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court did not apply this definition in Unemploy-
ment Comp. Bd. of Rev. v Tickle, 19 Pa Commw 550, 339 A2d 864 (1975), the Pennsylvania
Superior Court had applied the definition in Conroy Unemployment Comp. Case, 215 Pa
Super 83, 257 A2d 65 (1969); Pulver Unemployment Comp. Case, 207 Pa Super 112, 215
A2d 269 (1965); Mattson Unemployment Comp. Case, 194 Pa Super 307, 167 A2d 321
(1961).
7. Section 401(e) of the Law, 43 Pa Stat § 801(e) (1991). New York and Rhode Is-
land are the only states that have retained this type of eligibility in cases involving labor
disputes. Amy E. Ault, Judicial Interpretation: The Pennsylvania Right of Strikers to Re-
ceive Unemployment Compensation, 7 J L & Commerce 125, 126 n 5 (1987).
8. The 1942 amendment, Act of April 23, 1942, Sp Sess Pub L 60, moved the indus-
trial dispute disqualification from Section 401(e) of the Law to Section 402(d). The 1945
amendment, Act of May 29, 1945, Pub L 1145, primarily added the phrase "at the factory
establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed." The 1947 amend-
ment, Act of June 30, 1947, Pub L 1186, is discussed at note 16 and accompanying text.
9. One commentator noted in 1950 that "the doctrine that the right to benefits
should be gauged by the 'involuntary' nature of unemployment must be recognized as the
most influential theory in current case law." Shadur, 17 U Chi L Rev at 296 (cited in note
1). See also Lesser, 55 Yale L J at 171 (cited in note 6).
10. See, for example, Bonner v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 156 Pa Super 367,
40 A2d 106 (1944) (initially employee voluntarily suspended work but subsequent employer
action converted the voluntary separation to an involuntary separation); Barnas v Unem-
ployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 152 Pa Super 429, 33 A2d 258 (1943) (sympathy strikers must
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tion of "industrial dispute.""
These definitional problems were further complicated by concep-
tual problems involving uncertainty about whether Section 3 of the
Law (Declaration of Public Policy), 2 which twice refers to the eli-
gibility of employees who are unemployed through "no fault of
their own,"' 3 should be utilized in analyzing the'eligibility of em-
ployees who were unemployed as a result of an industrial dispute.
From 1936 to 1947, these problems were important only for the
limited purpose of denying benefits during an initial waiting pe-
riod. That benefits were mandatory after the initial waiting period
was evident in Urda Unemployment Comp. Case,'4 a case in which
members of the United Mine Workers of America were eligible for
benefits after the initial waiting period under the 1945 Act even
though they had initiated a work stoppage based on their tradi-
tional bargaining position of "no contract-no work."
In 1947, the legislature deleted the waiting period and extended
be considered voluntarily unemployed); Miller v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 152 Pa
Super 315, 31 A2d 740, 743 (1943) ("To call a suspension of work and act in concert to
prevent a continuance of operation, without resorting to the legal measures open to deter-
mine the rights of the parties, amounts to a voluntary suspension of work, with the neces-
sary consequences provided in the Act"); Phillips v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 152
Pa Super 75, 30 A2d 718 (1943) (sympathy strikers must be considered voluntarily
unemployed).
11. See, for example, Barnas v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 152 Pa Super 429,
33 A2d 258 (1943) (sympathy strike deemed to be an industrial dispute); Miller v Unem-
ployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 152 Pa Super 315, 31 A2d 740, 742 (1943) ("Such a dispute
does not have to be between employer and employees. It may be between the employees and
their Union or bargaining agency, provided it involves the employer and affects the terms or
conditions of employment").
12. 42 Pa Stat § 752 (1937). See note 2 for the text of Section 3. For example, in
Miller, 31 A2d 740 (1943), the court specifically referred to Section 3 in analyzing the "vol-
untary suspension of work" provision; in Bonomo Unemployment Comp. Case, 161 Pa
Super 622, 56 A2d 288 (1948), the court, however, specifically stated that Section 3 must
yield to the specific provisions of Section 402(d). This uncertainty continues today. Compare
Gladieux Food Servs., Inc. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 479 Pa 324, 388 A2d 678,
682 (1978) ("A claimant should not be denied benefits unless he is excluded by the plain
and unambiguous language of the law"), and Jones v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev.,
513 Pa 45, 518 A2d 1150, 1151 (1986) ("Section 3 has repeatedly been held to supply an
independent basis for denying unemployment compensation benefits where a claimant's loss
of employment resulted from some voluntary activity which related to his ability to perform
the work required"). For a review of the bureaucratic indecision concerning the use of Sec-
tion 3, see Richard H. Wagner, Unemployment Benefits in Labor Disputes, 53 Dickinson L
Rev 187, 188-89 (1949).
13. For a discussion of Section 3, see Daniel R. Schuckers and James K. Bradley, The
Proper Use of the Declaration of Public Policy Section of the Pennsylvania Unemploy-
ment Compensation Law, 87 Dickinson L Rev 507 (1983).
14. 161 Pa Super 594, 56 A2d 393 (1948).
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the disqualification for the length of the work stoppage. 15 The leg-
islature also deleted the phrase "voluntary suspension of work re-
sulting from an industrial dispute" and substituted the phrase
"unemployment is due to a stoppage of work, which exists because
of a labor dispute."' 6 The superior court interpreted these amend-
ments to mean that the legislature in utilizing the phrase "stop-
page of work" did not envision an analysis of the claimants' voli-
tion and included all stoppages of work regardless of fault.17 The
Pennsylvania Superior Court specifically rejected the argument of
the claimant and the Unemployment Compensation Board of Re-
view18 (hereinafter "the Board") that "stoppage of work" applies
only to stoppages due to the fault of the employees and held that
the phrase "stoppage of work" in the 1947 amendment included
both strikes and lockouts.
III. ENACTMENT OF THE 1949 LOCKOUT EXCEPTION
In 1949, the legislature amended Section 402(d) to include the
lockout exception: "unemployment is due to a stoppage of work,
which exists because of a labor dispute (other than a lockout)."'"
Surprisingly, very little legislative history and no legislative de-
bates accompany this historic change in Section 402(d).20 The 1949
15. The legislative history of the 1947 amendment is sparse. The authors believe,
however, that the 1947 amendment was a legislative reaction to the dilemma set forth in
Urda, i.e., a reaction to the grant of benefits (after an initial waiting period) to claimants
whose unemployment was obviously the result of their own actions. The work stoppage in
Urda began in 1946 and the unemployment compensation referee's grant of benefits was
affirmed by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review and the superior court
under the 1945 amendment.
16. Act of June 30, 1947, Pub L 1186. The 1947 amendments also added for the first
time the three provisos that remain in the law today. See note 4 where this is quoted in full.
That these provisos must be read as conjunctive tests was established in Curcio Unemploy-
ment Comp. Case, 165 Pa Super 385, 68 A2d 393 (1949).
17. Midvale Co. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 165 Pa Super 359, 67 A2d 380
(1949). The superior court specifically stated:
In our opinion the elimination of the words "voluntary suspension of work" contained
in the amendment of 1945 and the substitution therefor of the words "stoppage of
work" in the amendment of 1947 is most significant and clearly evinces an intent on
the part of the Legislature to remove from consideration in determining eligibility,
and to render immaterial, any question as to the voluntary or involuntary nature of
or the blame or fault for the stoppage.
Midvale Co., 67 A2d at 363.
18. The Board's position is set forth in Wagner, 53 Dickinson L Rev at 187 (cited in
note 12).
19. Act of May 23, 1949, Pub L 1738.
20. The authors believe that the 1949 amendment was a legislative reaction to the
application of the 1947 amendment to the facts of Midvale. The 2,270 employees of the
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amendment to Section 402(d) clearly reintroduced the concept of
fault21 in Section 402(d).22
IV. THE 1950s: GROPING FOR STANDARDS
In the 1950s, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 23 analyzed the
1949 amendment on numerous occasions and tried, with some suc-
cess, to develop definite standards for distinguishing strikes and
lockouts for unemployment compensation purposes.
Although the 1949 amendment did not define a strike or a lock-
out, the superior court had little difficulty in providing definitions.
For example, in the 1951 Hogan Unemployment Comp. Case,24 the
superior court stated:
A strike is a concerted refusal by employees to do any work for their em-
ployer ... until the object of the strike is attained, that is, until the em-
ployer grants the concession demanded. . . .The core of a lock-out is the
act of an employer in withholding work, which includes the physical closing
of the place of employment, . . . but is not limited to the existence of that
condition. An employer may impose a lock-out without physically closing
his plant or without forbidding access to it by his employees.
25
The superior court, however, recognized that the application of the
definition of a lockout was often difficult and that "a lock-out may
be present in varying factual situations, and no definition can com-
prehend all its manifestations. '26 Thus, a lockout for purposes of
Section 402(d) could be a physical lockout or a constructive lock-
Midvale Company offered to continue working under the terms and conditions of the expir-
ing collective bargaining agreement and to submit the issue of wage reductions to arbitra-
tion. The employer rejected this offer and notified the union of a general and uniform cut in
pay, effective in five days. The next day the employees began a work stoppage. The Unem-
ployment Compensation Board of Review's grant of benefits (totalling approximately
$1,000,000) was reversed by the superior court.
21. Richard H. Wagner, 1949 Amendments to the Unemployment Compensation
Law, 54 Dickinson L Rev 177, 179 n 6 (1949-50).
22. Pennsylvania is one of fourteen states that grants benefits if a work stoppage is
deemed a lockout instead of a strike. Ault, 7 J L & Commerce at 126-27 (cited in note 7). As
indicated in note 7, two states (New York and Rhode Island) have retained durational stan-
dards, i.e., denial of benefits for an initial period only.
23. Prior to 1970, unemployment compensation cases were appealed from the Unem-
ployment Compensation Board of Review to the Pennsylvania Superior Court and then,
upon an application for allocatur, to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. With the creation of
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in 1970, jurisdiction over such appeals was trans-
ferred from the superior court to the commonwealth court, with the appeal to the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court by way of petition for allowance of appeal remaining unchanged. See
42 Pa Con Stat §§ 724, 763(a) (1991).
24. 169 Pa Super 554, 83 A2d 386 (1951).




out.27 Much of the litigation in this area since 1949 has involved
the argument that while the employer's conduct did not constitute
a physical lockout, it did constitute a constructive lockout.
Three concepts emerged in the 1950s as the superior court ana-
lyzed the strike-lockout distinction contained in the 1949 amend-
ment. First, the cases are replete28 with references to concepts of
fault and responsibility for the work stoppage. The party that was
at fault within the meaning of the public policy section of the
Law29 bore the responsibility for the resulting work stoppage.
Second, the cases are replete"° with references to a party's ac-
tions being the final cause of the work stoppage or its equivalent.
The terminology often differed. For example, in Morris Unemploy-
ment Comp. Case,31 the court referred to "the final and effective
27. Duer Spring and Mfg. Co. v Department of Labor and Industry, 906 F2d 968,
971 (3d Cir 1990). As noted in Wagner, 53 Dickinson L Rev at 191 (cited in note 12): "The
idea that a lockout necessarily involves a padlock or an unconditional withholding of work
by the employer, if ever popularly entertained, lost favor during the revolution of the
1930's."
28. For example, see Hogan, 83 A2d 386 (1951) (claimants, by adopting a "no con-
tract, no work" position, caused the work stoppage and became unemployed through their
own fault within the meaning of Section 3 which is the "lode star" by which all provisions of
the Law are construed); Leto v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 176 Pa Super 9, 106 A2d
652 (1954) (responsibility for the work stoppage is used in the sense of "fault" within the
meaning of the public policy section of the Law); Hughes Unemployment Comp. Case, 187
Pa Super 252, 144 A2d 685 (1958) (the actions of the employer and employees must be
subjected to the test of a reasonable desire to maintain the employment status; if the fault is
attributable to only one, the result is either a lockout or a strike; if the fault is attributable
to both, compensation must be denied because the Law was enacted for the benefit of per-
sons "unemployed through no fault of their own"); Accurti Unemployment Comp. Case, 187
Pa Super 391, 144 A2d 673 (1958) (the fundamental idea of the Law is to provide a reserve
fund to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own); Parise
Unemployment Comp. Case, 188 Pa Super 569, 149 A2d 683 (1959) (the duty of the com-
pensation authorities is to determine whether the employees are unemployed through no
fault of their own, i.e., if the employees have acted consistent with the desire to remain
employed, they are entitled to compensation).
29. 43 Pa Stat § 752.
30. For example, see Hogan, 83 A2d 386 (1951) (the Board is to ascertain the direct,
immediate, final and effective cause of, the potent and activating reasons for, the work stop-
page); Morris Unemployment Comp. Case, 169 Pa Super 564, 83 A2d 394 (1951) (employees
struck in order to gain a concession from employer, which was the final and effective cause
of the work stoppage); Leto v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 176 Pa Super 9, 106 A2d
652 (1954) (refusal of the employer to maintain the status quo for even a short period of
time precipitated the work stoppage and was the final cause); McGinnis v Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Rev., 184 Pa Super 95, 132 A2d 749 (1957) (the shutdown of the plant was the
final step in the plan of the employer to strengthen its bargaining position and the final
responsibility for the work stoppage rested upon it); Hutchins Unemployment Comp. Case,
187 Pa Super 109, 144 A2d 588 (1958) (the final cause of the work stoppage was the refusal
of the union members to work without a contract).
31. 169 Pa Super 564, 83 A2d 394 (1951).
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cause of the work stoppage"3 2 whereas in Hogan (decided the same
day), the court referred to "the direct, immediate, final and effec-
tive cause of, the potent and activating reasons for, the stop-
page."3 3 The party that was the final cause of the work stoppage
bore the unemployment compensation consequences.
The third concept, which apparently was first advanced in 1951
by the Board in Morris and which ultimately became the standard
in Pennsylvania, was a "freeze-the-status-quo" test.3 4 In Morris,
the superior court specifically approved the Board's conclusion
that:
In all work stoppage cases, the first question, therefore, must be whether
the employes might, had they so desired, have continued working under the
existing terms and conditions of employment. If they have the opportunity
to do so, but instead choose to suspend work with the view to improving
their working conditions, the responsibility for their unemployment rests on
them and the stoppage which ensues is not a "lockout" within the meaning
of the Law.3 5
Three years later in Leto Unemployment Comp. Case,36 the su-
perior court for the first time specifically adopted the "freeze-the-
status-quo" test when it stated, "The refusal of the employer to
maintain the status quo for, even a short period of time precipi-
tated the work stoppage. ... ,,37 That the "freeze-the-status-quo"
test was not the sole test is evident when the superior court imme-
diately added the phrase "and was the final cause thereof."3 "
The superior court, in the most difficult and bitterly contested 9
case of the 1950s, utilized all three concepts when it analyzed the
32. Morris, 83 A2d at 397.
33. Hogan, 83 A2d at 390.
34. Id at 394.
35. Id at 397. This type of analysis is also found in Burleson Unemployment Comp.
Case, 173 Pa Super 527, 98 A2d 762, 766 (1953) ("Where, as here, the plant remains open,
the employes are requested to return to work, and full employment is available to all em-
ployes at the wages and on the terms of employment prevailing at the time the work stop-
page occurred, a labor dispute or a strike is not transformed into a lock-out").
36. 176 Pa Super 9, 106 A2d 652 (1954).
37. Leto, 106 A2d at 655.
38. Id.
39. The bitterness of this dispute involving 23,000 claimants and $9,500,000 is out-
lined in the subsequent case of Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce v Torquato, 386
Pa 306, 125 A2d 755 (1956). The plaintiffs successfully sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Labor and Industry from paying benefits prior to judicial review. It must be noted that in
light of California Dept. of Human Resources Development v Java, 402 US 121 (1971),
payment of unemployment compensation must now be made "at the earliest stage of unem-
ployment ... after giving both the worker and the employer an opportunity to be heard."
Java, 402 US at 131. Accordingly, Torquato has been implicitly overruled.
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work stoppage involving Westinghouse Electric's facilities through-
out the Commonwealth.40 At issue in McCracken Unemployment
Comp. Case4 was a work stoppage which took the form of a strike
beginning in October of 1955. On December 19, 1955, the Governor
of Pennsylvania sent a telegram to the employer and the union
urging both parties to "submit their dispute to final and binding
arbitration. 4 2 The Governor also stated that the employees would
return to work while arbitration proceeded. The union accepted
the Governor's proposal without reservation whereas the employer
rejected the proposal. The work stoppage continued until March,
1956, when the dispute was settled. At issue was the eligibility of
the claimants for the period from December 19, 1955, to March
1956. Utilizing concepts of fault,43 final cause,44 and freezing the
status quo, 45 the superior court reversed the Board's grant of bene-
fits for the period from December through March. Of particular
importance was the court's rejection of the union's argument that
its agreement to binding arbitration and the employer's rejection
of binding arbitration was sufficient to convert the strike into a
lockout; the court specifically noted that the employer was under
no obligation, contractual or otherwise, to submit the labor dispute
to binding arbitration.
V. Vrotney Unemployment Compensation Case (1960)
In 1960, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for the first time ana-
lyzed the strike-lockout distinction and established a definitive,
objective test. In Vrotney Unemployment Comp. Case,46 the em-
ployees, after giving notice that a strike would take place, offered
to continue working on the basis of the existing collective bargain-
ing agreement for an indefinite period (with a five-day cancellation
notice by either party) whereas the employer, a steel manufacturer,
continued to hold its plant open for its employees but only under
the terms set forth in the employer's last offer. The ensuing work
40. For example, one of the four Westinghouse Electric cases involved 10,000 employ-
ees at East Pittsburgh, Trafford, Linhart, Turtle Creek, and Homewood; 6,000 employees at
Sharon; and 200 employees in Philadelphia. McCracken Unemployment Comp. Case, 187
Pa Super 403, 144 A2d 679, 680 (1958). This case is also referred to as Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. (No. 2).
41. 187 Pa Super 403, 144 A2d 679 (1958).
42. McCracken, 144 A2d at 681.
43. Id at 682, 683.
44. Id at 682.
45. Id at 682, 684.
46. 400 Pa 440, 163 A2d 91 (1960).
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stoppage was deemed to be a lockout by the Board. The superior
court reversed on the basis that the employees' conditions were un-
reasonable and on the basis that the "freeze-the-status-quo test"
was not the sole test for distinguishing strikes from lockouts.47
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the superior court's
analysis, reversed the denial of benefits, and set forth a definitive,
objective standard for distinguishing strikes from lockouts. The
court stated that the sole test under Section 402(d) of whether a
work stoppage is a strike or a lockout is the following:
Have the employees offered to continue working for a reasonable time under
the pre-existing terms and conditions of employment so as to avert a work
stoppage pending the final settlement of the contract negotiations; and has
the employer agreed to permit work to continue for a reasonable time under
the pre-existing terms and conditions of employment pending further nego-
tiations? If the employer refuses to so extend the expiring contract and
maintain the status quo, then the resulting work stoppage constitutes a
"lockout" and the disqualification for unemployment compensation benefits
in the case of a "stoppage of work because of a labor dispute" does not
apply.4
This test is strikingly similar to the test set forth by the Board in
Morris in 1951 and Leto in 1954.
Despite the definitive and mandatory nature of this test, the su-
preme court, after adopting the above test as the sole test under
Section 402(d), proceeded to refer to the "final cause" analysis.
49
This gratuitous afterthought was also evident in the superior
court's analysis in Leto.50 Thus, the supreme court, while saying
that it was adopting a single test, failed to definitely resolve the
issue of whether the superior court's analysis from the 1950s in-
volving "fault" and "final cause" should be abandoned. Neverthe-
less, Vrotney has remained the single most important case in
Pennsylvania for distinguishing strikes from lockouts.
VI. REFINING THE Vrotney STANDARDS
Having established the definitive standard for distinguishing
strikes and lockouts for unemployment compensation purposes,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that the standard
is "most difficult to apply to any given set of facts."5' 1 Defining the
47. Vrotney Unemployment Comp. Case, 188 Pa Super 405, 146 A2d 751 (1958).
48. Vrotney, 163 A2d at 93-94 (1960).
49. Id at 94.
50. See the analysis accompanying notes 37 and 38.
51. Philco Corp. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 430 Pa 101, 242 A2d 454, 455
Vol. 30:477486
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status quo and reasonable time has been difficult in many cases.
Such difficulties have raised questions about the appellate courts'
willingness to exclude the concepts of "fault" and "final cause"
when analyzing the strike-lockout distinction.
A. Status Quo
The Vrotney test requires the parties to offer to continue the
existing status quo, i.e., the pre-existing terms and conditions of
employment. In other words, a party must agree to extend the
terms and conditions of employment that existed at 11:59 p.m. on
the last day of the existing collective bargaining agreement or face
the unemployment compensation consequences. The party that
fails to make the initial "peace" move of offering to continue the
status quo will lose the subsequent unemployment compensation
case.5 2 If the work stoppage takes the form of a strike, the burden
is on the employees to show that they offered to continue the sta-
tus quo." Conversely, if the work stoppage takes the form of a
lockout, the burden is on the employer to show that it offered to
continue the status quo.
5 4
(1968). There were relatively few appellate court cases in the 1960s involving the strike-
lockout distinction; this would appear to be the result of the economic prosperity that ex-
isted during that decade.
52. Philco Corp., 242 A2d at 456. Occasionally, both parties will refuse to offer to
continue the existing status quo in which case benefits must be denied in light of the pur-
pose of the Unemployment Compensation Law, which is to benefit faultless employees.
Toma v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 4 Pa Commw 38, 285 A2d 201 (1971).
53. Philco Corp., 242 A2d at 456. It should be noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has been very willing to expand its traditional scope of review in strike-lockout cases.
For example, in Philco Corp., 242 A2d at 456 n 2, the court stated "that the question of
whether a work stoppage was caused by the union or by management is not a pure question
of fact, but is, at most, a mixed question of fact ind law." Although the desire to expand the
traditional scope of review is understandable in light of the number of claimants, the
amount of benefits and the depth of emotions that these cases often engender, this ex-
panded scope of review is contrary to the statutory scope of review. See Reuben and
Schuckers, 50 Temple L Q at 228 (cited in note 5) and Willard A. Lewis, The Lockout
Exception: A Study in Unemployment Insurance Law and Administrative Neutrality, 6
Cal W L Rev 89, 104 n 70 (1969). The lack of clarity as to the supreme court's scope of
review remains a constant in strike-lockout cases. Compare Borello v Unemployment Comp.
Bd. of Rev., 490 Pa 607, 417 A2d 205, 207 (1980) ("Our scope of review [in Section 402(d)
cases] is limited to a determination as to whether any errors of law were committed and,
'absent fraud,' that the Board's findings are supported by the evidence"), and Norwin
School Dist. v Belan, 510 Pa 255, 507 A2d 373, 378 (1986) ("Thus, in reviewing [the ques-
tion of whether a work stoppage was caused or perpetuated by the union or by manage-
ment], the appellate court must make an independent determination").
54. Miceli v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 519 Pa 515, 549 A2d 113, 116 (1985);
Comment, Employer's Economic Justifications for Rejecting Union's Return to Work Offer
Irrelevant to Reasonable Time Analysis, 64 Temple L Rev 313, 317 (1991).
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Of critical importance is the timing of the offer to continue the
status quo. Although no appellate court cases specifically address
this issue," the offer must be made in sufficient time before 11:59
p.m. on the last day of the existing collective bargaining agreement
to allow the other party to consider the offer and to respond. Such
a "sufficient response time" requirement is implicit in Vrotney.
Moreover, an offer to revoke a change in the status quo and to
offer to continue the status quo may satisfy Vrotney if made the
evening prior to the proposed 8:30 a.m. changes in the employer's
schedule and if the other party is not available, as promised, for
further negotiations.
6
Also of critical importance is how the offer to continue the status
quo is manifested, i.e., is an oral offer sufficient under Vrotney or
can the offer be inferred from conduct? Most appellate court cases
stress the bargaining position of the parties at 11:59 p.m., particu-
larly when an oral offer to continue the status quo has been made.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has stated: "In deter-
mining the workers' right to unemployment benefits, entitlement
must turn on the actual conduct of the respective sides and not
upon the rhetoric of the negotiations. '6 7 Accordingly, the offer to
continue the status quo under Vrotney may manifest itself orally
and/or by conduct. However, if an offer to continue the status quo
is inconsistent with a party's conduct, the other party may reject
the offer as not being made in good faith.
58
The "status quo" requirement set forth in Vrotney is intended
to freeze the position of the parties while they continue to negoti-
ate. As stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
The underlying rationale for the status quo requirement is that during the
interim period between contracts, the employer may continue operations
55. See, however, Kerner v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 68 Pa Commw 132,
448 A2d 666 (1982), wherein the union, two weeks prior to the expiration of existing con-
tract, twice offered to extend the existing contract and the employer, in rejecting these of-
fers, stated that an extension could be discussed a couple of days prior to the expiration of
the existing contract. The union's failure to renew its offer just prior to the expiration of the
existing contract resulted in the court's conclusion that the work stoppage was a strike.
56. Colonial School Dist. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 53 Pa Commw 29, 416
A2d 1152 (1980).
57. Borello, 417 A2d at 209 (court in stressing the conduct of the parties noted that
assertions, demands, and threats of the parties immediately prior to the commencement of
the work stoppage are to be anticipated).
58. McKeesport Area School Dist. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 40 Pa
Commw 334, 397 A2d 458 (1979) (union members had good reason to know that school
district's letter did not involve a good faith offer in light of school district's repeated refusal
during the same day of the union's offer to continue working).
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and the employee may continue working, while the parties are free to nego-
tiate on an equal basis in good faith. Maintenance of the status quo is
merely another way of stating that the parties must continue the existing
relationship in effect at the expiration of the old contract.59
The Pennsylvania appellate courts have on numerous occasions
stated that the status quo involves the identical terms and condi-
tions that existed under the previous collective bargaining agree-
ment; no "de minimis" deviation will be accepted for unemploy-
ment compensation purposes.6
Although the status quo is easily defined, the Pennsylvania ap-
pellate courts have had considerable difficulty in applying the con-
cept to the numerous factual variations of work stoppages that
have arisen since Vrotney. The authors have identified several
problems in the application of the status quo concept. The appel-
late courts have satisfactorily addressed some of the problems;
others, however, have not been addressed with consistency and
uniformity.
1. Shifting Status Quo
The most difficult problem of the "status quo" requirement has
involved the question of a shifting "status quo," i.e., does the sta-
tus quo refer to: (1) the terms and conduct at the expiration of the
collective bargaining agreement, (2) the terms and conduct that ex-
isted just prior to the work stoppage, (3) the terms and conduct
during the week in which benefits are claimed? In other words, can
the applicable "status quo" shift for purposes of Vrotney? This
problem arose in the 1970s and 1980s in two factual contexts.
First, the parties may at the expiration of the collective bargain-
ing agreement agree to extend the prior agreement while negotia-
tions continue and this interim agreement may slightly vary from
the terms of the prior agreement. If a work stoppage later occurs,
does the "status quo" refer to the terms of the prior written agree-
ment or to the terms of the interim agreement? Although the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not specifically addressed this is-
59. Fairview School Dist. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 499 Pa 539, 454 A2d
517, 521 (1982).
60. Chichester School Dist. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 53 Pa Commw 74,
415 A2d 997 (1980) (court specifically declined to adopt a de minimis rule of deviation that
would allow one party to agree to work or agree to permit work under "substantially the
same" preexisting terms and conditions of employment pending further negotiations). Ac-
cord Grandinetti v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 87 Pa Commw 133, 486 A2d 1030




sue of a shifting status quo in this context, the commonwealth
court has rejected it unless a written, complete interim agreement
"covering all points in contest" had been reached.6' The court spe-
cifically stated that it is "unwise to regard a preliminary incom-
plete oral agreement as a new status quo for purposes of Section
402(d)." 62 Thus, absent a written, all-inclusive, interim agreement,
the operative status quo is that which existed at the expiration of
the collective bargaining agreement.
The commonwealth court's reluctance to accept the shifting
"status quo" concept even with a complete written extension was
evident in Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. v Haughton Elevator
Co. 3 At the expiration of the prior agreement on March 23, the
parties agreed to extend it upon two conditions: (1) any new agree-
ment would be applied retroactively to March 23, and (2) both
parties had the right to terminate the interim agreement upon
twenty-four hours notice.6 4 On March 29, the company notified the
union that it was exercising its right to terminate the interim
agreement; the union then advised its members to cease work on
March 30. Was the ensuing work stoppage a strike or a lockout?
The commonwealth court, reversing the Board's award of benefits,
rejected the Board's argument that "a new or moving status quo
result[ed]" '65 when the parties entered the interim agreement, and
held that the work stoppage on March 30 was a strike. Thus, the
operative status quo was that which existed at the expiration of
the collective bargaining agreement (March 23) and not that which
existed at the expiration of the agreement to extend that contract
(March 29).
Rejection of the shifting status quo concept is not consistent
with the objectives of Vrotney, especially when the parties reduce
the interim agreement to writing as in Haughton Elevator. Once
the interim agreement has been reduced to writing, the "pre-ex-
61. Morysville Body Works, Inc. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 29 Pa Commw
297, 370 A2d 820, 822 (1977).
62. Morysville Body Works, Inc., 370 A2d at 822.
63. 21 Pa Commw 307, 345 A2d 297 (1975).
64. Haughton Elevator Co., 345 A2d at 298.
65. Id at 300. The authors submit that this opinion was improperly decided and that
the court confused the employer's right to terminate the interim agreement with the unem-
ployment compensation consequences of exercising that right. For example, the court in
rejecting the shifting status quo concept concluded that the employer "has merely exercised
its right to terminate that agreement, a right fully exercisable as a condition of the agree-
ment. And, as such a condition, the right to terminate must also be treated as part of the
status quo." Id. Such a conclusion implicitly accepted the shifting status quo concept yet
misapprehended its unemployment compensation consequences.
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isting terms and conditions of employment" under Vrotney should
include the expired collective bargaining agreement and the in-
terim written agreement. Any other interpretation would ignore
the intent of the parties and the supreme court's statement in
Vrotney that "all parties must be sincere in their desire to main-
tain the continued operation of the employer's enterprise." 6 Of
crucial importance in terms of the status quo is "the continued op-
eration of the employer's enterprise" and not the continued effi-
cacy of the expired collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the sta-
tus quo should include the expired collective bargaining agreement
and any interim written agreement.1
7
The most difficult problem involving the shifting status quo con-
cept has involved the issue of whether a party's acquiescence in a
unilateral change by the other party constitutes acceptance of a
new or shifting status quo. In one of the most bitterly contested
unemployment compensation cases since 1936, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. v Sun Oil
Co.6 8 failed to address the question of whether the union's acquies-
cence in the employer's unilateral changes constituted a new or
shifting status quo. In Sun Oil, the collective bargaining agreement
expired January 6. The agreement was extended on a day-to-day
basis, but in mid-February the employer notified the union that it
was terminating the day-to-day extension of the agreement on
February 17 and, absent a new agreement, it would implement
some of its proposals. No agreement was reached and the employer
unilaterally implemented several of its proposals. The union mem-
bers continued to work and did not strike, even though the em-
ployer had clearly altered the status quo. On March 14, the em-
ployer announced its intention to implement additional changes on
March 25. On March 18, the union voted to strike and 1,700 union
members went on strike on March 19.
66. Vrotney, 163 A2d at 93.
67. In Philco Corp., the court implicitly recognized the shifting status quo concept as:
the test of whether a work stoppage resulted from a strike or a lockout requires us to
determine which side, union or management, first refused to continue operations
under the status quo after the contract had technically expired, but while negotia-
tions were continuing.
Philco Corp., 242 A2d at 455.
68. 476 Pa 589, 383 A2d 519 (1978). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion was
very short and failed to address the substantial issues raised in this case. Although the opin-
ion and result are correct, the lack of depth of analysis is unfortunate. For a more complete
analysis of the strike-lockout issue and of the federal preemption issue, see Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Rev. v Sun Oil Co., 19 Pa Commw 447, 338 A2d 710 (1975).
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Was the operative status quo the state of affairs on January 6,
February 17, or March 18? Without specifically addressing the is-
sue, the court in affirming the grant of benefits merely stated, "It
cannot be disputed that Sun Oil's actions constituted a refusal to
further extend the expiring contract and maintain the status
quo."6 Certainly the status quo had been changed by the employer
on February 17, but had the union acquiesced for three and one-
half weeks in the employer's unilateral changes? It would seem so.
When the union struck on March 19, wasn't this merely a reaction
to the employer's action of March 14, i.e., the announcement of the
implementation of additional changes? It would seem so.
The failure of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Sun Oil in
1978 to address the acquiescence aspect of the shifting status quo
problem resulted in further confusion in this area in the 1980s.
This confusion was most evident in Local 730 v Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Rev.,70 where the collective bargaining agreement ex-
pired on April 5 and the parties continued to work under the terms
and conditions of the expired agreement. On June 19, the employer
unilaterally increased wages and benefits. The union worked under
those terms and conditions until July 20. On July 21, the union
voted to reject the employer's terms and conditions and to go on
strike. Did the union's failure to object to the employer's unilateral
increases for thirty-three days constitute acquiescence in a new
status quo? Was the operative status quo that which existed on
June 18 or on July 20?
Implicitly accepting the shifting status quo argument71 but re-
jecting the "acquiescence" theory based on the applicable facts,
the court stated:
We must therefore conclude that there was a disruption of the status quo as
a result of the Employer's actions on June 18. We also are satisfied that this
disruption was of the type envisioned by the Vrotney rule. Moreover, the
69. Sun Oil, 383 A2d at 522.
70. 505 Pa 480, 480 A2d 1000(1984). The acquiescence issue was also evident in Burk
v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 119 Pa Commw 360, 547 A2d 497 (1988), where the
employees, after a nine-month period of unemployment due to a fire after the expiration of
the prior agreement, returned to work on March 12 (under the employer's unilaterally im-
plemented final offer) and then on March 25 refused to work. The court concluded that the
employer's action of imposing its final offer resulted in a lockout and that the time lapse
(thirteen days) was insufficient to establish an agreement by the employees with the em-
ployer's final offer.
71. The shifting status quo concept is evident in the following: "While a modification
by mutual agreement of terms and conditions of employment pending the outcome of on-
going negotiations would not be inconsistent with the objectives bf Vrotney, the instant
record does not support the existence of such an agreement." Local 730, 480 A2d at 1004.
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unilateral character of the Employer's action of June 18 was not trans-
formed into a mutual agreement simply because the Union waited thirty-
three days before the work stoppage.
7 2
The court, in affirming the grant of benefits, also rejected the em-
ployer's argument that a change in the status quo envisioned under
Vrotney necessarily requires a detriment to the other party.7 3 The
irony of Local 730 cannot be overemphasized; the employer, in-
stead of maintaining the status quo, unilaterally increased wages
and benefits and bore the unemployment compensation
consequences!
The dissent, relying upon the fault concept found in Section 3 of
the Law, implicitly accepted the employer's acquiescence theory
and harshly criticized the rigid application of Vrotney:
The majority's holding that the Employer's implementation of superior
terms and conditions of employment was, constructively, a lockout, simply
because that action disturbed the status quo ante, undermines the purposes
for which our General Assembly enacted the Unemployment Compensation
Law and ignores the legislative intent underpinning Section 402(d). The
majority's application of the Vrotney rule to the facts of this case shows
once again how the insensible extension of a per se rule, adopted for the
convenience of courts, can lead to an inappropriate result when applied in a
mechanical and arbitrary fashion. The Vrotney rule, with its emphasis on
the disturbance of the status quo ante to separate strikes from lockouts,
may sometimes be a valuable aid to reasoning. It is not a substitute for
reasoning. The world of collective bargaining is not comfortably encased in
a clockwork universe.
7 4
The dissent, however, missed an opportunity to address the precise
issue presented by the shifting status quo concept: did the employ-
ees' acceptance of increased pay during a thirty-three-day period
result in a new status quo, i.e., a new agreement concerning the
terms and conditions of employment?
Therefore, while the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has implicitly
adopted the shifting status quo concept under Vrotney, the Penn-
sylvania appellate courts have been reluctant to apply the concept
absent a written, complete interim agreement or absent an ex-
tended period (certainly more than thirty-three days!) of acquies-
cence in unilaterally implemented changes.
The second factual context arises after the expiration of the col-
72. Id at 1006.
73. A similar argument was rejected in All American Gourmet Co. v Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Rev., Pa Commw ,598 A2d 1351 (1991) (employer's grant of amnesty for
those who had violated the employer's attendance policy disrupted the status quo).
74. Local 730, 480 A2d at 1007 (Hutchinson dissenting).
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lective bargaining agreement when the parties alter their positions
and attempt to argue that such a change converts a strike into a
lockout or a lockout into a strike. Is the operative "status quo" to
be measured at the expiration of the collective bargaining agree-
ment or during the week in which benefits are claimed?
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically addressed this is-
sue in High v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev.,75 a case in which
the parties "switched" positions. When the collective bargaining
agreement expired on June 30, the parties continued to negotiate.
On October 26, however, the employees did not report to work be-
cause the employer demanded that the employees work a longer
day. Two days later, the parties "switched" positions when the em-
ployer offered to resume operations under the terms and condi-
tions of the expired agreement and the employees rejected the of-
fer. The supreme court held that the lockout of October 26 and 27
became a strike on October 28 when the parties "switched" posi-
tions. The court rejected the initial-responsibility test in this con-
text and adopted a week-to-week test. The court quoted from
McCracken:
Each week of unemployment is the subject of a separate claim, the validity
of which is determined by a consideration of conditions existing within that
week; consequently, a work stoppage which is initially a strike may subse-
quently be converted into a lockout.76
The court, relying upon the fault provisions of Section 3, affirmed
the denial of benefits for the period after October 28." Thus, for
purposes of Vrotney the initial-responsibility test is inapplicable if
the parties switch positions. In such cases, the courts apply the
week-to-week test 78 of High.
79
75. 505 Pa 379, 479 A2d 967 (1984). The supreme court affirmed the commonwealth
court's denial of benefits; the commonwealth court, however, had premised its denial on a
final cause analysis. High v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 67 Pa Commw 472, 447 A2d
701 (1982).
76. High, 479 A2d at 969. In McCormick Dray Lines, Inc. v Unemployment Comp.
Bd. of Rev., 74 Pa Commw 181, 459 A2d 74, 76 (1983), the court specifically stated that the
week-to-week test has not been questioned subsequent to McCracken in 1958.
77. The three-member dissent relied upon Philco Corp., 242 A2d 454 (1968), for the
proposition that the party responsible for the work stoppage is the party which first refused
to continue the status quo, i.e., the dissent applied the initial-responsibility test.
78. It must be noted that claimants who are ineligible for any portion of a week
under Section 402(d) must lose benefits for the entire week. Jehn v Unemployment Comp.
Bd. of Rev., 110 Pa Commw 209, 532 A2d 57 (1987); Demoss v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev., 71 Pa Commw 83, 454 A2d 1146 (1983).
79. Hoffman v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 524 Pa 470, 514 A2d 57 (1990)
(strike of August 6 was converted into a lockout because employees' offer on October 23 to
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2. Precise Terms of the Status Quo
During the 1980s, four identifiable problems arose concerning
the precise contents80 of the status quo under Vrotney. The courts
have had considerable difficulty analyzing these problems and
their decisions were not entirely consistent. The supreme court's
definition of status quo as "the last, actual, peaceable and lawful
noncontested status which preceded the controversy"81 is well-ac-
cepted. The application of this definition, however, to specific fac-
tual situations is difficult.
A particularly difficult problem is whether "status quo" refers to
the terms of the expired collective bargaining agreement or to the
conduct of the parties under that agreement. This problem has
usually arisen when the expired agreement gives one of the parties
a choice of conduct. For example, in Miceli v Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Rev.,s2 the expired agreement contained a provision
allowing for voluntary overtime. The employees' unilateral sub-
stantial reduction of voluntary overtime did not change the status
quo in light of the provisions of the expired agreement allowing for
such conduct. The "status quo" was changed by the employer
when it later unilaterally instituted a mandatory overtime policy.
In other words, the "status quo" refers to the terms of the expired
agreement and if those terms give one of the parties a choice of
conduct, such as with a voluntary overtime provision, the exercise
of that choice does not alter the "status quo.""
Another problem has arisen when the expired agreement gives a
party the choice of A or its equivalent. For example, if an expired
continue working under the preexisting terms and conditions was for a reasonable period of
time for purposes of Vrotney; a two-member dissent applied the initial-responsibility test
and would have denied benefits throughout the work stoppage); Effort Foundry, Inc. v Un-
employment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 125 Pa Commw 505, 558 A2d 571 (1989) (lockout of Decem-
ber 14 was not converted into a strike because employer's offer on January 12 to make work
available at the same wage rate contained various conditions); Jehn, 532 A2d 57 (1987)
(strike of August 15 was not converted into a lockout because employees' offer on Septem-
ber 6 to return to work contained an unreasonable period of time for purposes of Vrotney).
80. The phrase "terms and conditions of the expired contract" includes not only
wages but also fringe benefits such as medical coverage, dental coverage, and life insurance.
Bethlehem Area School Dist. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 45 Pa Commw 498, 405
A2d 1026, 1029 (1979).
81. Fairview School Dist., 454 A2d at 520.
82. 519 Pa 515, 549 A2d 113 (1988). The supreme court's order reversed the common-
wealth court which had ruled that the employees' unilateral substantial reduction of volun-
tary overtime constituted a change in the status quo. Miceli v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev., 93 Pa Commw 502, 502 A2d 297 (1985).
83. This scenario, however, should not be confused with a situation in which a party
exercises a contractual provision allowing for the termination of the contract. See note 65.
1992 495
Duquesne Law Review
agreement requires the employer to provide Blue Cross and Blue
Shield coverage or equivalent coverage, the unemployment com-
pensation authorities must ascertain whether the employer's shift
to non-Blue Cross, non-Blue Shield coverage is equivalent cover-
age. If such a shift did not involve equivalent coverage, the em-
ployer by making such a shift must bear the unemployment com-
pensation consequences."4
A third problem has arisen when the expiring collective bargain-
ing agreement contains terms that become effective in the future,
i.e., beyond the expiration date of the agreement. For example, if
an agreement provides for a step-up in pay based on additional
years of service, does the extension of that agreement require the
employer, for purposes of preserving the status quo, to pay the
next yearly increment?
In Fairview School Dist. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. 85
and Union City School Dist. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev.,86 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court mistakenly answered in
the negative and mistakenly engrafted concepts of labor relations
law into the definition of status quo for unemployment compensa-
tion purposes. The court favorably quoted New York8 7 and
Maine8 cases for the proposition that the status quo includes the
expiring terms and conditions of employment but does not include
any term that becomes effective after the expiration of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. This analysis not only freezes the terms
and conditions of employment at 11:59 p.m. on the last day of the
expiring agreement, it also freezes reality as of 11:59 p.m. on the
last day of the expiring agreement, i.e., it ignores the fact that
some employees (those with an additional year of service) were en-
titled to a bargained-for increase in pay after the collective bar-
gaining agreement had expired and after it had been extended by
mutual agreement. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ignored the
84. Norwin School Dist., 507 A2d 373 (1986) (Board's finding of nonequivalency was
supported by substantial evidence and the employer's unilateral implementation of alterna-
tive coverage was deemed a change in the status quo). For a pre-Norwin case in which the
court improperly failed to review the employer's unilateral change when the expired agree-
ment allowed for such a change, see Grandinetti v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 87 Pa
Commw 133, 486 A2d 1040 (1985) (employer's unilateral change of insurance carriers was
deemed a change in the status quo as a matter of law).
85. 499 Pa 539, 454 A2d 517 (1982).
86. 499 Pa 548, 454 A2d 522 (1982).
87. Board of Co-Op Educ. Servs. v New York State Pub. Employment Relations Bd.,
41 NY2d 753, 363 NE2d 1174 (1977).




intentions of the parties as reflected in the expired agreement and
its extension. As noted by the dissent in Fairview School Dist., the
"school district's failure to increase the teachers' salaries to reflect
an additional year of service constituted a refusal to maintain the
status quo."89 Until the court reexamines the logic of these deci-
sions, demand for or implementation of prospective terms of an
expired collective bargaining agreement is risky.
A fourth problem, which is the converse of the third problem,
has arisen when an offer to continue the status quo also contains a
retroactivity provision, i.e., a provision that any new agreement be
made retroactive to the date of the expiration of the existing agree-
ment. Such an offer is inconsistent with Vrotney in that the status
quo makes no allowance for retroactivity.90
In summary, the status quo for purposes of Vrotney, absent any
concerns pertaining to a shifting status quo, refers to the terms
and conditions of employment that existed at 11:59 p.m. on the
last day of the expiring agreement. If the expiring agreement gives
one of the parties a choice of conduct, the exercise of that choice
does not alter the status quo.91 If the expiring agreement gives one
of the parties a choice of A or its equivalent, the choice of the
equivalent does not alter the status quo.92 If the expiring agree-
ment contains terms that become effective in the future, i.e., be-
yond the expiration date of the expiring agreement, the refusal to
implement those terms does not alter the status quo.93 Similarly, if
the proposed agreement contains a retroactivity provision, the re-
fusal to accept the retroactivity provision does not alter the status
quo.
9 4
89. Fairview School Dist., 454 A2d at 522. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed
the commonwealth court, which had properly concluded that the employer's failure to com-
ply with all the terms of the expired agreement constituted a refusal to maintain the status
quo. Fairview School Dist., 434 A2d 884 (1981).
90. Loftus v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 54 Pa Commw 271, 420 A2d 1351
(1980) (employees' offer to continue working if the employer would agree to make provisions
in the new agreement retroactive to the date on which the existing agreement expired did
not satisfy Vrotney). See also Gladieux Food Services, Inc. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev., 27 Pa Commw 142, 365 A2d 889 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 479 Pa 324, 388 A2d
678 (1978).
91. Miceli, 549 A2d 113 (1985).
92. Norwin, 507 A2d 373 (1986).
93. Fairview School Dist., 454 A2d 517 (1982); Union City School Dist., 454 A2d 522
(1982). As indicated above, the authors believe that these cases were improperly decided,
i.e., these cases failed to reflect the terms and conditions upon which the parties had agreed.
94. Loftus, 429 A2d 1351. See note 90.
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3. Exceptions to the Status Quo Test
Since adoption of the Vrotney test, three arguments have been
advanced suggesting exceptions to Vrotney. One of these, the futil-
ity doctrine, has been completely accepted and applied by the ap-
pellate courts. Another, the economic necessity doctrine, has been
completely rejected by the supreme court after apparently being
accepted by the commonwealth court. The third, the impasse doc-
trine, has been mysteriously mentioned by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court but later specifically rejected by the commonwealth
court.
The one deviation from the status quo analysis of Vrotney that
has been accepted by the appellate courts is the futility doctrine,
which was first enunciated by the superior court in 1962 in Irvin
Unemployment Comp. Case95 and later recognized by the supreme
court in Philco Corp. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev.96 The
essence of the futility doctrine is that a party should not be re-
quired to do a futile thing, i.e., should not be required to offer to
continue the status quo if the conduct of the other party clearly
demonstrates that such an offer would be futile. 9
7
95. 198 Pa Super 308, 181 A2d 854, 858 (1962) ("We do not believe that our Supreme
Court [in Vrotney] intended to require the Union to do a futile thing. . . . There is suffi-
cient [evidence] in this record as a whole to support the Board's position that the union
attempted to request a further extension of the contract in an attempt to resolve the eco-
nomic issue, and that this effort was thwarted by [the employer's] ultimatum"; the em-
ployer's ultimatum was that work was available but only on the employer's terms).
96. 430 Pa 101, 242 A2d 454, 457 (1968) (although recognizing the futility doctrine,
the supreme court found it inapplicable to a situation where the employer's position prior to
the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement was that the employer's plant's "ulti-
mate survival" was at stake and that the employer's business would be a "waste of time,
money and effort" without a new contract; the court refused to apply the futility doctrine,
reasoning that the employer's position did "not approach the threatening tone of the speech
delivered by management in Irvin").
97. Irvin, 181 A2d at 858. The commonwealth court has adopted and applied the
futility doctrine in numerous cases. See Grimm v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 127 Pa
Commw 368, 561 A2d 1286 (1989) (Board committed no error in its conclusion that it would
not have been futile for the union to have made an offer to continue the status quo); Effort
Foundry, Inc. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 125 Pa Commw 505, 558 A2d 571 (1989)
(union had no duty to have its membership vote on a contract extension and then present a
formal offer to management because the employer had already rejected even the suggestion
of an extension); Burk v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 119 Pa Commw 360, 547 A2d
497 (1988) (it would have been futile, for claimant to make an offer to return to work under
the terms of the expired contact, particularly in view of employer's announcement that it
was unilaterally implementing its changes); Odgers v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 89
Pa Commw 439, 492 A2d 808 (1985), aff'd, 514 Pa 378, 525 A2d 359 (1987) (it would have
been futile for the claimants to make an offer to return to work under the terms of the
expired contract because of the school board's unilateral modification of the collective bar-
gaining agreement and the implementation of its modified budget); Bishop v Unemploy-
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One of the most difficult conceptual problems with the futility
doctrine is distinguishing in hindsight an ultimatum as in Irvin
and the typical posturing and rhetoric of the negotiations as in
Borello v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev."8 and in Philco. For
the practicing bar, which does not have the advantage of hindsight,
this problem is particularly acute.
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has accepted the fu-
tility doctrine, it has specifically rejected any argument that the
failure to satisfy the Vrotney test can be based on economic neces-
sity. This argument was advanced several times in the 1980s by
employers who faced increasing international competition and
sought to reduce labor costs. In this era of economic "give backs,"99
several employers sought to develop an exception to Vrotney, i.e.,
the economic-necessity exception. This argument was specifically
rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1990 in Hoffman v
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. and Joy Manufacturing:100
The Vrotney standard is simple and easy to apply on an administrative
level.. . . It is not necessary to make inquiries into issues of good faith and
economic justification as the Board and the Commonwealth Court have
done here. These inquires have led the Board and Commonwealth Court to
deviate from the maxim of simplicity and unduly complicate the question of
who bears responsibility for the continuation of the work stoppage. 1 '
ment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 90 Pa Commw 553, 496 A2d 110 (1985) (futility doctrine was appli-
cable but the case was remanded for further findings with respect to whether the employer
would have allowed the claimants to continue working under the terms and conditions of
the expired agreement while negotiations continued); Kerner v Unemployment Comp. Bd.
of Rev., 68 Pa Commw 132, 448 A2d 666 (1982) (futility doctrine was inapplicable because if
the union had seriously wished to avoid a strike, it should have proposed an extension to the
contract in the last minutes of negotiations); Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. v Sun Oil,
19 Pa Commw 447, 338 A2d 710 (1975), aff'd, 476 Pa 589, 383 A2d 519 (1978) (court noted
the futility doctrine but did not rely upon it because the union had offered to extend the
status quo and had actually worked under the status quo for several weeks before the em-
ployer changed it).
98. 490 Pa 607, 417 A2d 205, 209 (1980). See note 57.
99. In Portec, Inc. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 104 Pa Commw 629, 522 A2d
1180 (1987), the court refused to deviate from Vrotney in the era of economic "give backs":
The employer argues that Vrotney is inapplicable ... because this case involves a so-
called "give-back" that is, a situation where the employer seeks to reduce wages and
benefits, not merely to negotiate over the amount of any increase. Due to depressed
conditions in the Commonwealth's "smoke stack" industries, it is not uncommon for
an employer to seek reduction in employee wages and benefits .... Our Supreme
Court has determined that Vrotney is the law and that any change in the status quo
by the employer constitutes a lockout.
Portec, Inc., 522 A2d at 1181-82.
100. 524 Pa 470, 574 A2d 57 (1990).
101. Hoffman, 574 A2d at 63 (citation omitted).
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Acceptance of the employer's economic necessity theory but rejec-
tion of the employer's economic necessity evidence as insufficient
was evident in numerous commonwealth court cases in the late
1980s.' 02 In Hoffman, however, the supreme court declared that an
employer's economic justification is of no legal consequence
whereas the commonwealth court had previously rejected the em-
ployer's economic justification evidence as inadequate 03
Thus, the employer is precluded from introducing evidence that
continuation of the status quo would result in economic ruin or
that concessions are necessary to improve competitive standing. In
an era of economic concessions or economic givebacks, an employer
must be aware that the "pre-existing terms" prong of Vrotney is
not satisfied by introduction of evidence concerning economic ne-
cessity or economic justification.
A third exception to Vrotney that has arisen is contained in a
gratuitous and even mysterious footnote in Local 730 in 1984.
Footnote 5 states:
Nor can it legitimately be argued that the Vrotney rule is unfair to the
Employer in that it could conceivably require the employer to continue
under the terms of the preexisting contract into perpetuity. Vrotney by its
express language qualified the length of time during which this status quo
must be maintained by stating: "has the employer agreed to permit work to
continue for a reasonable time under the preexisting terms and conditions
102. Grinnell Corp. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 127 Pa Commw 298, 561
A2d 843 (1989) (employer did not contend that maintenance of the status quo for a reasona-
ble time would cause economic ruin or that its proposed extension was essential to its con-
tinued operations); Orr v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 120 Pa Commw 45, 548 A2d
360 (1988) (employer's bargaining position was to substantially decrease production costs by
reducing labor costs; employer disrupted the status quo when it would allow work only
under its final offer); Teledyne Vasco v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 119 Pa Commw
583, 547 A2d 841 (1988) (record failed to support employer's argument that impasse and
economic losses were the reasons for employer's unilateral implementation of final offer);
Babcock & Wilcox Co. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 119 Pa Commw 566, 547 A2d
850 (1988) (employer's implementation of its final offer altered the status quo in light of
employer's failure to prove reduction in wages and benefits as contained in final offer was
essential to continued operation); General Tel. Co. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 100
Pa Commw 81, 514 A2d 264 (1986) (employer's alteration of an agreed-upon extension con-
stituted a lockout unless the employer demonstrated that the action was essential to contin-
ued operations).
103. In a recent analysis of Hoffman in Comment, 64 Temple L Rev at 323 (cited in
note 54), the author stated that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "failed to explain why
courts should evaluate economic justifications when applying the 'pre-existing terms' prong
of the Vrotney test, but should disregard economic justifications when applying the 'reason-
able time' prong." The author properly cited an anomaly under Vrotney and Hoffman, but
got it backwards; economic justification is not to be evaluated under the "pre-existing
terms" prong of Vrotney, but is to be evaluated under the "reasonable time" prong of
Vrotney. The anomaly, however, is evident.
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of employment. ... ." Vrotney Unemployment Compensation Case, 400 Pa
440, 444, 163 A2d 91, 93 (1960). Where it is evident that an impasse has




No authority for this proposition is cited and it is difficult to un-
derstand the supreme court's need to insert this footnote. Further-
more, the "impasse" analysis of footnote five has been specifically
rejected by the commonwealth court.1
0 5
4. School Districts and the Status Quo Test
In 1977, the legislature for the first time specifically provided
unemployment compensation coverage to those employed in the
public schools of the Commonwealth. 0 6 Numerous cases involving
the strike-lockout distinction and public school employees have
arisen since 1977. Most of these cases have involved the straight-
forward application of Vrotney. In a few cases, however, certain
issues have arisen that involve the unique nature of public school
employment. The courts have refused to alter the Vrotney stan-
dards to accommodate this unique employment situation.
Of particular importance are the school calendar cases. Most, if
not all, public school districts in Pennsylvania adopt a school cal-
endar that provides for the necessary days of instruction and be-
gins shortly before or shortly after Labor Day and ends shortly af-
ter Memorial Day. If the school calendar is delayed from Labor
Day to, say, September 15, who is to bear the unemployment com-
pensation consequences? If the original school calendar establishes
September 15 as the first day of school, the public school employ-
ees' unemployment between Labor Day and September 15 is not
the result of a lockout 0 7 and benefits will be denied between Labor
Day and September 15. If, however, the starting date is established
and then unilaterally moved to September 15 as a result of the
104. Local 730, 480 A2d at 1005 n 5.
105. See Grinnell Corp., 561 A2d 843 (1989), and cases cited therein. InGrinnell, the
commonwealth court specifically stated that it "has repeatedly considered the argument of
impasse and has consistently rejected it, refusing to deviate from the rule announced in
Vrotney." Id at 846.
106. Act 22 of July 6, 1977, Pub L 41, effective January 1, 1978.
107. Nawrocki v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 97 Pa Commw 121, 508 A2d 1311
(1986) (court emphasized that Section 1504(a) of the Public School Code of 1949, Act of
March 10, 1949, Pub L 30, as amended, 24 Pa Stat § 15-1504(a), empowers the school dis-
trict to fix the date for the start of the school year; the school calendar was established in
May and was never altered).
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labor dispute, a lockout'018 results for the period from the original
starting date to September 15.
Similarly, the argument that the public school employees must
be denied benefits from Labor Day to September 15 under the
"between two successive academic years" provisions of Section
402.1 of the Unemployment Compensation Law' 09 has been re-
jected."0 Acceptance of such an argument would mean "the
[school] district could indefinitely impede claimant's eligibility.""'
If, however, the school employees were locked out from Labor Day
to September 15 and yet received pay for this period," 2 benefits
must be denied in light of the fact that the employees were not
technically unemployed" 3 during this period, i.e., they received re-
muneration during the period at issue."
4
The commonwealth court, in a series of cases in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, rejected the unusual argument by various school
districts that they were precluded from offering a continuation of
the fringe benefit provisions of the expired collective bargaining
agreement.1 5 The argument that payment of such fringe benefits
was violative of Pennsylvania's Public Employe Relations Act"16
was determined to be without merit for collective bargaining pur-
108. Lehigh County Community College v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 81 Pa
Commw 348, 473 A2d 727 (1984) (lockout occurred when employer conditioned its adoption
of a new school calendar upon the employees' ratification of a new agreement); Mountain
View School Dist. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 59 Pa Commw 510, 436 A2d 1225,
1226 (1981) (lockout occurred because employer on August 28 stated that "the school calen-
dar would be approved when the teachers contract was finalized"); Centennial School Dist.
v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 56 Pa Commw 86, 424 A2d 569 (1981) (lockout oc-
curred when employer on August 17 passed a "no-new-contract-no-work" resolution delay-
ing the start of school indefinitely until a new contract was signed).
109. 43 Pa Stat § 802.1.
110. See McKeesport Area School Dist. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 40 Pa
Commw 334, 397 A2d 458 (1979).
111. Mountain View School Dist. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 59 Pa Commw
510, 436 A2d 1225, 1227 (1981).
112. Such an arrangement is not uncommon; the school employees work approxi-
mately 180 to 190 days per year; some receive pay throughout the year on a weekly or bi-
weekly basis.
113. Sections 401 and 4(u), 43 Pa Stat §§ 801, 753(u).
114. Bennett v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 89 Pa Commw 1, 491 A2d 314
(1985).
115. Elizabeth Forward School Dist. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 54 Pa
Commw 194, 420 A2d 785 (1980); School Dist. of Erie v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev.,
48 Pa Commw 460, 409 A2d 982 (1980); Bethlehem Area School Dist. v Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Rev., 45 Pa Commw 498, 405 A2d 1026 (1979).
116. Act of July 23, 1970, Pub L 563, 43 Pa Stat §§ 1101.101-1101.2301 (1991).
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poses' 17 and also for purposes of continuing the status quo under
Vrotney.1 8
B. Reasonable Time
Vrotney requires the parties to offer to continue the status quo
for a reasonable time. In a case decided the same day as Vrotney,
Lerch Unemployment Comp. Case,"" the supreme court deter-
mined that reasonable time depends upon the nature of the em-
ployer's business. In Lerch the employer "consist[ed] mainly of
service industries, i.e., a hotel, laundry, department store, commu-
nity inn. .. .2"o The court specifically rejected the union's argu-
ment that a day-to-day extension satisfied the Vrotney test and
stated:
The nature of these industries is such that it would be almost impossible to
operate them adequately on a day to day basis. There was, therefore, more
than enough justification under these circumstances for the Employer to
take the position that it would be impractical to operate such service estab-
lishments on a twenty-four hour basis.
121
Accordingly, benefits were denied because the union's offer did not
satisfy the "reasonable time" prong of Vrotney.
There are three situations in which the definition of reasonable
time is crucial under Section 402(d) of the Unemployment Com-
pensation Law. The first involves a shutdown in anticipation of a
strike and the question of how much time an employer should be
afforded to take protective measures in anticipation of a strike.
The second involves the application of Vrotney as discussed in
Lerch. The third involves a resumption of the employer's opera-
tions after a work stoppage and the issue of how much time an
employer should be afforded after a strike to resume operations.
Each situation involves ascertaining the definition of reasonable
time and the question of the deference the courts are going to give
to an employer's honest judgment.
Reasonable time is important in the context of anticipatory
shutdowns before a strike and resumptions of operations after a
117. In re Appeal of Cumberland Valley School Dist., 483 Pa 134, 394 A2d 946 (1978)
(public employer violated its duty to bargain under the Public Employe Relations Act by
unilaterally discontinuing payment of various fringe benefits that were provided in the ex-
pired collective bargaining agreement).
118. Elizabeth Forward School Dist., 420 A2d 785 (1980).
119. 400 Pa 446, 163 A2d 535 (1960).




strike because an employer should not have to pay unemployment
compensation for the period in which unemployment is caused by
the employees' actions. A highly refined body of law concerning
reasonable time has developed in this area with the lead cases be-
ing Lavely Unemployment Comp. Case1 2 and Bako Unemploy-
ment Comp. Case..23 Lavely dealt with reasonable time in the con-
text of an anticipatory shutdown and the superior court concluded:
When a strike is imminent, when an employer has been officially notified
that a strike will occur, and has reasonable grounds for a belief that the
strike will actually take place, he may, prior to and in anticipation thereof,
take reasonably necessary measures to protect his property during the pen-
dency of the strike. The nature and extent of such measures depend upon
the kind of work and the circumstances in which it is conducted, and ordi-
narily the Board will not overrule the honest judgment of an employer.
124
Bako dealt with reasonable time in the context of a resumption
of operations and the superior court concluded:
The rationale of the second Lavely case is applicable also during the time
reasonably required to put the plant in normal operation after the strike
ends. What is a reasonable period will always "depend upon the kind of
work and the circumstances in which it is conducted." In a department
store, for instance, resumption of employment might follow the strike's ter-
mination in the course of a few hours. Perhaps a textile mill would require a
longer time. In an industry, such as Bethlehem Steel, operating several de-
partments which are dependent for power upon a central plant, with equip-
ment to be repaired, machinery cleaned, and other preparatory steps to be
taken, a longer time must necessarily be allowed. Possibly, the duration of
the strike becomes a relevant factor. At all events, the Board will consider
all the circumstances and override the management only when it finds that
it failed to exercise honest judgment. 2
5
Thus, the definition of reasonable time in Lavely and Bako was
dependent upon judicial deference to the employer's honest
judgment.
Nonetheless, judicial reluctance to defer to the employer's hon-
est judgment in defining reasonable time pursuant to Viotney is
evident in several cases involving work stoppages in which school
districts were the employers.2 6 In several cases in the late 1970s
and early 1980s involving school districts, the employees' offers to
122. 166 Pa Super 481, 72 A2d 300 (1950).
123. 171 Pa Super 222, 90 A2d 309 (1952).
124. Lavely, 72 A2d at 302.
125. Bako, 90 A2d at 312.
126. As noted in note 107 and accompanying text, school employees were first covered
by the Unemployment Compensation Law in 1978.
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continue the status quo on a daily basis were rejected by the school
districts. In each case, 27 the ensuing work stoppage was deter-
mined to be a lockout with the commonwealth court, relying upon
Lerch, stating that reasonable time under Vrotney depends upon
the circumstances of each case. Of particular importance is the
commonwealth court's statement in Elizabeth Forward School
Dist. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. :128
We have never categorically classed a day-to-day extension as unreasonable
in the school context, but have always held that a reasonable time depends
upon the circumstances. . . . Here the district has offered no more than
conclusory statements concerning the alleged difficulties of such an
arrangement.12
Rejection of the employer's conclusory statements is not consistent
with Lavely and Bako. Adoption of a reasonable time, honest judg-
ment test in the Vrotney context would be consistent with the rea-
sonable time, honest judgment test under Lavely and Bako in the
anticipatory shutdown and resumption of operations contexts.' 30
While case law has developed no definite standard concerning
offers to continue working on a day-to-day basis, it has clearly re-
jected offers involving annual extensions of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. For example, offers of one-year extensions'"' and
three-year extensions' 32 have been determined as not involving
reasonable time under Vrotney. Such offers have been considered
as offers for new annual or multi-year contracts and not as offers to
continue the status quo during negotiations.
133
Reasonable time has been held to encompass forty-eight
127. Bethlehem Area School Dist., 405 A2d 1026 (1979) (union's offer to extend the
expired contract on a day-to-day basis with a forty-eight hour termination notice was for a
"reasonable time"); McKeesport Area School Dist., 397 A2d 458 (1979) (employer failed to
show that day-to-day extension was unreasonable under the circumstances of the case). See
also Mountain View School Dist., 436 A2d at 1227 (without relying upon Lerch, the court
stated that it could not regard "as insufficient the union's offer to work 'on a day to day
basis ... while negotiations continue' ").
128. 54 Pa Commw 194, 420 A2d 785 (1980).
129. Elizabeth Forward School Dist., 420 A2d at 788 (citation omitted, emphasis
added). Particularly troublesome although not yet addressed by the courts is the issue of
whether a school district may insist for unemployment compensation purposes upon more
than a day-to-day extension if the history of labor relations between the parties has in-
volved "sporadic" strikes by the school employees.
130. For a more expansive discussion of this issue, see Reuben and Schuckers, 50
Temple L Q at 226 n 89 (cited in note 5).
131. Jehn, 532 A2d 57 (1987); Bishop, 496 A2d 110 (1985).
132. Bedow v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 97 Pa Commw 192, 510 A2d 152
(1986).
133. Bishop, 496 A2d at 113.
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hours,3 five days, 35 one month 36 and ninety days. 37 More impor-
tantly, the courts have been extremely receptive to the argument
that a multi-period offer satisfies the reasonable time requirement
of Vrotney. For example, in Klima Unemployment Comp. Case, 38
the superior court determined that the employees' offer to extend
the expiring contract for thirty, sixty, or ninety days was for a rea-
sonable time. Similarly, in Leto, the superior court determined
that the employees' offer to continue working under the existing
contract for fifteen days, one month, or one year was for a reasona-
ble time. Adherence to the approaches set forth in Klima and Leto
may avoid unnecessary work stoppages and unnecessary litigation.
Such approaches are consistent with Vrotney in that they "allow
additional time for negotiation.
''139
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE LOCKOUT EXCEPTION
Since the adoption of unemployment compensation laws in the
mid-1930s, commentators 4  have noted that state -neutrality is an
important theme in the administration of the unemployment com-
pensation system, particularly in the area of labor disputes. This
requires that unemployment compensation authorities ignore both
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the parties' demands
and the underlying merits of the labor dispute. 14'
Beginning in the early 1970s, various employers challenged
Pennsylvania's lockout exception as violative of the state neutral-
ity principle. They argued that the state's payment of unemploy-
ment compensation to employees who are locked out (physically or
134. Teledyne Vasco v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 119 Pa Commw 583, 547
A2d 841 (1988) (employer engaged in manufacturing); Watkins v Unemployment Comp.
Bd. of Rev., 61 Pa Commw 249, 433 A2d 594 (1981) (employer operated a bus line).
135. Vrotney, 163 A2d at 91.
136. Centennial School Dist. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 56 Pa Commw 86,
424 A2d 569 (1981).
137. Crile Machine Co. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 110 Pa Commw 150, 531
A2d 1191 (1987) (employer operated a machine company).
138. 205 Pa Super 489, 211 A2d 23 (1965).
139. Leto, 106 A2d at 653.
140. Annotation, Unemployment Compensation: Application of Labor Dispute Dis-
qualification to Locked Out Employee, 62 ALR3d 437, 443 (1975); Shadur, 17 U Chi L Rev
at 297 (cited in note 1); Lesser, 55 Yale L J at 175 (cited in note 6).
141. Shadur, 17 U Chi L Rev at 297 (cited in note 1), citing Bankston Creek Collier-
ies, Inc. v Gordon, 399 Ill 291, 77 NE2d 670, 675 (1948); Wagner, 53 Dickinson L Rev at
193-94 (cited in note 12) ("The 'fault' to be determined ... relates not to the merits of the
dispute and the positions of the parties therein, but rather to the responsibility for resorting
to a stoppage of operations or work because of the dispute").
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constructively) altered the balance between management and labor
prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act 142 and therefore
was invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitu-
tion.143 The Pennsylvania courts have rejected this challenge. 44
This preemption issue was initially rejected by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Sun Oil in 1978, one year prior to the United
States Supreme Court's landmark decision in New York Tel. Co. v
New York State Dept. of Labor, 45 in which a plurality of the
Court concluded that "there was no evidence that the Congress
that enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 intended to
deny the States the power to provide unemployment benefits for
strikers."' 46 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Duer Spring
and Mfg. Co. v Department of Labor and Industry147 in 1990, put
this challenge to rest in Pennsylvania when it specifically applied
the rationale of New York Tel. to Pennsylvania's lockout exception
and concluded that, "Pennsylvania has chosen to make the strike/
lock-out distinction on the basis of the status quo, a neutral objec-
tive standard which does not tilt the scale in either direction."'
' 48
VIII. AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES DOCTRINE
Work stoppages that occur during a collective bargaining agree-
ment require an analysis totally different from the Vrotney analy-
sis. These cases have usually involved an employer's unilateral ac-
tion that precipitates action by the employees resulting in a work
stoppage.
In the 1950s, the superior court developed the "availability of
alternative remedies" doctrine to analyze this type of case. The
clearest statement of this doctrine was set forth in Accurti Unem-
142. 29 USC § 151 et seq.
143. United States Const, Art VI, cl 2.
144. Penflex, Inc. v Bryson, 506 Pa 274, 485 A2d 359 (1984); Gladieux Food Services,
Inc., 388 A2d 678 (1978); Sun Oil, 383 A2d 519 (1978); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 547 A2d 850
(1988); Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. v Borger Steel Co., 30 Pa Commw 75, 372 A2d
969 (1977).
145. 440 US 519 (1979). The plurality opinion, written by Justice Stevens and joined
by Justices White and Rehnquist, concluded that Congress "decided to tolerate a substan-
tial measure of diversity," New York Tel. Co., 440 US at 520, in the administration of unem-
ployment compensation programs. Justice Brennan concurred in a separate opinion as did
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall.
146. Id at 540. At issue was the New York statute which, unlike Section 402(d) of the
Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law, grants benefits to striking employees after
an initial eight-week waiting period.
147. 906 F2d 968 (1990).




Employes who cease work because of an alleged breach of contract by the
employer are not entitled to compensation where the collective bargaining
agreement provides a grievance procedure for settlement of such disputes,
... or where there are legal or equitable remedies available. ... 150
Accurti illustrates the proper utilization of the "availability of al-
ternative remedies" doctrine. The employer during the collective
bargaining agreement unilaterally instituted a work survey that
was opposed by the union. The subsequent work stoppage took the
form of a strike and resulted in the denial of benefits.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the superior court also utilized this
doctrine to deny benefits to claimants who initiated a work stop-
page because of the employer's alleged failure to comply with pro-
visions of the collective bargaining agreement1 51 or because of the
employer's alleged failure to comply with state law 52 or federal law
and regulations. 53 Although the doctrine was sparingly utilized in
the 1960s and 1970s, the commonwealth court in the 1980s rejected
the argument that the "availability of alternative remedies" doc-
trine is no longer viable in Pennsylvania.
5 4
IX. EXCEPTIONS TO THE AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
DOCTRINE
While recognizing the viability of the "availability of alternative
remedies" doctrine, the appellate courts have noted an exception
to the doctrine and have recently created a second exception.
In 1963, the superior court created the first exception when, in
Southerland Unemployment Comp. Case, 5 it did not apply the
149. 187 Pa Super 391, 144 A2d 673 (1958).
150. Accurti, 144 A2d at 676 (citations omitted).
151. Arbechesky Unemployment Comp. Case, 174 Pa Super 217, 100 A2d 396 (1953)
(employer failed to contribute to the Health and Welfare Fund as required by the collective
bargaining agreement); Ross Unemployment Comp. Case, 192 Pa Super 190, 159 A2d 772
(1960) (employees disagreed with employer's interpretation of overtime provision of collec-
tive bargaining agreement).
152. Crucible Steel Co. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 183 Pa Super 629, 133
A2d 581 (1957) (employer allegedly violated state and federal laws on mine safety).
153. Cassell Unemployment Comp. Case, 167 Pa Super 440, 74 A2d 809 (1950) (em-
ployer allegedly failed to comply with the federal War Labor Board's directive concerning
retroactive payments; denial of benefits was based on the 1945 statute that denied them to
those unemployed because of a "voluntary suspension of work resulting from an industrial
dispute"). Cassell, 74 A2d at 812-13.
154. Murdoca v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 122 Pa Commw 303, 551 A2d
1157, 1162 (1988); Odgers, 492 A2d at 815.
155. 202 Pa Super 149, 195 A2d 138 (1963).
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doctrine to a situation in which the employees had "an honest and
sincere belief [that a newly implemented work procedure] consti-
tuted a genuine and immediate peril to life and limb."' ' 6 The
court, in affirming the grant of benefits to those who had initiated
a work stoppage, reasoned that the employer's new work procedure
"created an imminent and immediate peril to the workmen therein
and a situation that was more than a mere dispute to be settled
under grievance procedures.' 15 7 Thus, in situations involving work
safety, the courts have been willing to recognize an exception to
the "availability of alternative remedies" doctrine; however, as in
Southerland, the striking employees should be prepared to prove
that the new working conditions were unsafe and constituted an
immediate danger.
In 1988, the commonwealth court established a second exception
to the "availability of alternative remedies" doctrine. In Murdoca v
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev.," 8 the employer unilaterally re-
duced the employees' hourly wage from $4.90 to $4.20. The subse-
quent work stoppage resulted in a denial of benefits by the Unem-
ployment Compensation Board of Review on the theory that "the
Union failed to follow the grievance procedure provided for in the
agreement for the settlement of such disputes."'59 In reversing the
denial of benefits, the court specifically refused to apply the "avail-
ability of alternative remedies" doctrine and stated that the em-
ployer's "unilateral retroactive reduction in wages constituted so
egregious a breach of the agreement that [the employer] must bear
the responsibility for the work stoppage."'60 Whether the courts
will continue to apply and even expand this "egregiousness" excep-
tion to the doctrine is problematical. It must be noted, however,
that in Murdoca an employer representative agreed that the em-
ployer's unilateral wage reduction was "improper and clearly a vio-
lation of the agreement."''
156. Southerland, 195 A2d at 139. For analysis of Southerland and, a comparison with
King Unemployment Comp. Case, 133 A2d 581 (1957), see Lewis, 6 Cal W L Rev at 110-11
(cited in note 53).
157. Southerland, 195 A2d at 141.
158. 122 Pa Commw 303, 551 A2d 1157 (1988).
159. Murdoca, 551 A2d at 1160.
160. Id at 1161.
161. Id at 1158.
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X. THE ANOMALY OF THE AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE
REMEDIES DOCTRINE
Several commentators16 2 have observed that the unemployment
compensation standards differ for those claimants who are not cov-
ered and those who are covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment when the employer engages in unreasonable conduct,
breaches a contract or violates the law. For example, a claimant
who is not covered by a collective bargaining agreement would be
granted benefits after quitting the job if the employer engaged in
unreasonable conduct 63 or substantially breached a contract' or
violated the law.6 5 In each of these situations, the claimant who
had quit would be granted benefits.
The anomaly arises when several employees engage in concerted
action to protest the employer's unreasonable or illegal conduct. In'
such situations, benefits are denied if the "availability of alterna-
tive remedies" doctrine is applied. Yet in each of these situations
the employees did not quit their jobs; rather they temporarily sus-
pended work, i.e., they engaged in a work stoppage to protest the
employer's conduct.
One possible resolution of this anomaly is for the appellate
courts to abandon the "availability of alternative remedies" doc-
trine and to adopt the "informative communication/reasonable ac-
commodation" doctrine. This doctrine requires an employee who
voluntarily quits a job to inform the employer of the objectionable
162. Reuben and Schuckers, 50 Temple L Q at 229 (cited in note 5); Jerre S. Williams,
The Labor Dispute Disqualification-A Primer and Some Problems, 8 Vand L Rev 338, 371
(1955); Shadur, 17 U Chi L Rev at 304 (cited in note 1); Lesser, 55 Yale L J at 170 (cited in
note 6).
163. See Tucker v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 14 Pa Commw 262, 319 A2d 195
(1974) ("Normally, when any person is employed, he is employed to do a particular task at
an assigned time, and at an assigned place. It does not follow that the employer agrees never
to modify or change the task, the time, or the place. If the employer should decide to modify
or change any of these and the change is reasonable, the employee must abide by the em-
ployer's decision at the risk of being ineligible for unemployment compensation if he
refuses").
164. Monaco v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 523 Pa 41, 565 A2d 127, 130 (1989)
("employees are permitted to collect unemployment benefits after they have voluntarily
ceased employment on the grounds that the wages or working conditions have substantially
changed, to the point that voluntary termination is necessary").
165. Zinman v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 8 Pa Commw 649, 305 A2d 380
(1973) (claimant was required to record telephone communications, which is a misdemeanor
if without the permission of all parties; claimant quit and benefits were granted); Share v
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 99 Pa Commw 119, 512 A2d 794 (1986) (claimant, an
accountant, was requested to enter inaccurate financial information on the employer's books
and records; claimant quit and benefits were granted).
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condition and to allow the employer a reasonable period of time to
correct the condition. The origins of this doctrine for unemploy-
ment compensation purposes are contained in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court opinion in Genetin v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev.:166
Once [an employee] has communicated his medical problem to the employer
and explained his inability to perform the regularly assigned duties, an em-
ployee can do no more .... As long as the employee is available where a
reasonable accommodation is made by the employer, that is not inimicable
to the health of the employee, the employee has demonstrated the good
faith effort to maintain the employment relationship required under the
Act. To insist upon the employee's initiating the quest for an alternative
position, would require a meaningless ritual that does not further the objec-
tives of the Act .... [Slince [the employee] notified the employer of the
physical malady and his inability to perform his regular duties, it was then
incumbent upon the employer to provide suitable work. 
7
This "informative communication/reasonable accommodation"
analysis is applicable to claimants who voluntarily quit for reasons
involving sexual harassment, 1 68 transportation difficulties,6 9 or the
employer's repeated failure to pay the employee on a timely
basis. 71 0
In each of these situations, individual employees would be
granted benefits if they followed the "informative communication/
reasonable accommodation" doctrine. The authors believe that
there is no reason that this analysis should not be applied to con-
certed action by employees. Consistency and uniformity require
such an application.
XI. CONCLUSION
The labor dispute disqualification of the Pennsylvania Unem-
ployment Compensation Law is one that the legislature and the
courts have struggled to define in a way that properly implements
166. 499 Pa 125, 451 A2d 1353 (1982).
167. Genetin, 451 A2d at 1356.
168. St. Barnabas, Inc. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 106 Pa Commw 191, 525
A2d 885 (1987) (denial of benefits to claimant who failed to make employer aware of inci-
dents involving immediate supervisor).
169. Frable v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 53 Pa Commw 137, 416 A2d 1164
(1980) (denial of benefits to claimant who did not report to new office for new assignment).
170. Emgee Engineering Co. v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 30 Pa Commw 290,
373 A2d 779 (1977). For a case in which the employee voluntarily quit after not receiving
one paycheck and failed to ask the employer to assure a rigid payment schedule, see Koman




the goal of providing security for the worker unemployed through
no fault of his own while not disrupting the labor peace essential to
the economic stability sought by the general community. The labor
dispute disqualification has undergone legislative change since its
inception, culminating with the adoption of the lockout exception
in 1949. That exception, which is still in effect, reintroduced the
concept of fault by requiring the denial of benefits to those en-
gaged in a labor dispute other than a lockout. Since 1949, the labor
dispute disqualification has not been amended and case law con-
tinues to refine the issues. In 1960, the supreme court in Vrotney
provided a definitive test for determining whether workers engaged
in a labor dispute were entitled to benefits. The underlying ration-
ale of the maintenance of the status quo requirement therein was
to foster good faith bargaining while the employer continued oper-
ations and the employees continued working. This philosophical
concept is fundamental to the proper application of Section 402(d)
to any given set of facts. Unfortunately, in a few instances this
concept has been ignored by the appellate courts. The employers,
employees, and the public of this Commonwealth are entitled to
consistency and uniformity with resulting precedent upon which
they can rely and act in the future.
Areas of controversy and litigation are better understood within
an historical framework. This article has attempted to provide an
historical analysis while at the same time focusing on areas of pos-
sible controversy and litigation pertaining to the labor dispute dis-
qualification. Each area was discussed and specific changes in the
Law were suggested where warranted. The purpose of these sugges-
tions is to foster uniformity, thereby hopefully reducing the num-
ber of labor disputes, while at the same time forming a body of law
upon which the interested parties may ultimately rely.
The suggestions briefly reiterated below are offered to promote
an interpretation that is more consistent with the policy considera-
tions underlying the Law and the underlying rationale of Vrotney.
For the above reasons, these suggestions should be implemented
and/or continued to be followed:
1. The appellate courts' hesitancy in accepting the shifting status
quo concept is unfounded. Rejection of the shifting status quo con-
cept is not consistent with the objectives of Vrotney, i.e., to foster
good faith bargaining while work continues. Therefore, the shifting
status quo concept should be accepted particularly when the par-
ties reduce an interim agreement to writing.
2. Similarly, where the parties agree to and work pursuant to
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changed conditions, they acquiesce to the same, thereby creating a
new status quo that must be maintained under Vrotney for unem-
ployment compensation purposes.
3. An offer to maintain the status quo must be made with the only
exception to Vrotney being when it would have been futile for the
party to make such an offer. The futility doctrine is correct and
should be followed. The courts, however, should recognize the diffi-
culty parties have with the application of the futility doctrine in
light of the posturing that is typical in last minute negotiations.
Attempts to carve out exceptions to Vrotney should be rejected
outright as the supreme court has done pertaining to economic ne-
cessity,'7 ' and the commonwealth court has done pertaining to
impasse.
17 2
4. The maintenance of the status quo requirement under Vrotney
is applicable to all employers and the Vrotney analysis is control-
ling in matters involving school districts, even though the unique-
ness of the employment relationship must be recognized.
5. For purposes of anticipating shutdowns and resumptions of op-
erations, the definition of reasonable time is properly dependent
upon judicial deference to an employer's honest judgment.173 This
deference should also be extended to cases defining reasonable
time pursuant to Vrotney. Adoption of a reasonable time, honest
judgment test in the Vrotney context would be consistent with the
reasonable time, honest judgment test under Lavely and Bako.
6. The appellate courts should recognize that the "availability of
alternative remedies" doctrine creates an anomaly in the Law vis-
a-vis Section 402(b) and should consider replacing it with the "in-
formative communication/reasonable accommodation" doctrine
74
that allows the employee to establish eligibility by fully informing
the employer of the employee's concerns and allowing the em-
ployer the opportunity to correct the problem before the employee
takes further action by striking or quitting.
Most importantly, the practicing bar should be particularly
aware of the fact that the courts have been very receptive to the
argument that multiperiod offers satisfy the Vrotney reasonable
time requirement. An offer to extend an expiring contract thirty,
sixty, or ninety days has been held to be for a reasonable time,7
171. Hoffman, 574 A2d at 57.
172. Grinnell, 561 A2d at 843.
173. Lavely, 72 A2d 300 (1950); Bako, 90 A2d 309 (1952).
174. Genetin, 451 A2d 1353 (1982).
175. Klima, 211 A2d 23 (1965).
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as has an offer of fifteen days, one month, or one year.'7 6 Multiper-
iod offers effectuate the philosophy of maintaining the bargaining
process while work continues to the benefit of all parties involved.
The making of such offers should prevent frivolous labor disputes
with the commensurate benefit to the public at large and should, if
necessary, place the party in a formidable position for purposes of
ascertaining a worker's eligibility for unemployment compensation.
176. Leto, 106 A2d 652 (1954).
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